Abstract. This paper explores the Nash equilibria of a variant of the Colonel Blotto game, which we call the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game. In the Colonel Blotto game, two players simultaneously distribute forces across n battlefields. Within each battlefield, the player that allocates the higher level of force wins. The payoff of the game is the proportion of wins on the individual battlefields. In the asymmetric version, the levels of force distributed to the battlefields must be nondecreasing. In this paper, we find a family of Nash equilibria for the case with three battlefields and equal levels of force and prove the uniqueness of the marginal distributions. We also find the unique equilibrium payoff for all possible levels of force in the case with two battlefields, and obtain partial results for the unique equilibrium payoff for asymmetric levels of force in the case with three battlefields.
Introduction
In this section we discuss the background and origins of the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game.
The Colonel Blotto game, which originates with Borel in [Bor53] , is a constant-sum game involving two players, A and B, and n independent battlefields. A distributes a total of X A units of force among the battlefields, and B distributes a total of X B units of force among the battlefields, in such a way that each player allocates a nonnegative amount of force to each battlefield. The player who sends the higher level of force to a particular battlefield wins that battlefield. The payoff for the whole game is the proportion of the wins on the individual battlefields.
Roberson in [Rob06] characterizes the unique equilibrium payoffs for all (symmetric and asymmetric) configurations of the players' aggregate levels of force, and characterizes the complete set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions for most of these configurations for the Colonel Blotto game.
A possible variant of the Colonel Blotto game, which has not been studied before, is the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game, where the forces distributed among the battlefields must be in non-decreasing order.
The Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game is a constant-sum game involving two players, A and B, and n independent battlefields. A distributes X A units of force among the battlefields in a nondecreasing manner and B distributes X B units of force among the battlefields in a non-decreasing manner. Each player distributes forces without knowing the opponent's distribution. The player who provides the higher amount of force to a battlefield wins that battlefield. If both players deploy the same amount of force to a battlefield, we declare that 1 battlefield to be a draw, and the payoff of that battlefield is equally distributed among the two players.
1 The payoff for each player is the proportion of battlefields won. In this paper, we study the Nash equilibria and equilibrium payoffs of Asymmetric Colonel Blotto games.
In Section 3, we find a family of equilibria for the game with three battlefields and equal levels of force, and we prove the uniqueness of the marginal distribution functions. We also prove that in any equilibrium strategies for a game with equal levels of force and at least three battlefields, there are no atoms in the marginal distributions.
In Section 4, we find the unique equilibrium payoffs of all cases of the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game involving only two battlefields, and in Section 5 we find the unique equilibrium payoffs in the case of three battlefields in certain cases. We conclude with Section 6, where we discuss the difficulties in extending our work to the case of n ≥ 4 battlefields.
The model
In this section we introduce the model and related concepts. The definitions in this section are adaptations from those in [Rob06] to the asymmetric version.
2.1. Players. Two players, A and B, simultaneously allocate their forces X A and X B across n battlefields in a nondecreasing manner. Each player distributes forces without knowing the opponent's distribution. The player who provides the higher level of force to a battlefield wins that battlefield, gaining a payoff of 1 n . If both players deploy the same level of force to a battlefield, that battlefield is a draw and both players gain a payoff of . The payoff for each player is the proportion of battlefields won, or equivalently, the sum of the payoffs across all the battlefields.
2
Player i sends x k i units to the kth battlefield. For player i, the set of feasible allocations of force across the n battlefields in the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game is denoted by B i :
Definition 2.1. Given an n-variate cumulative distribution function H, for every x, y ∈ R n such that x k ≤ y k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the H-volume of the n-box
Intuitively, the H-volume of a n-box just measures the probability that a point within that n-box will be chosen given the cumulative distribution function H.
1 As we show in Theorem 3.5, Nash equilibria of games with equal levels of force do not contain atoms, so the probability that the two players place equal force on some battlefield is 0. Thus we may, if we choose, use a different tie-breaking rule without altering the result in this case.
2 That the payoff for each player is the sum of the payoffs across all the battlefields means that two different joint distributions are equivalent if they have the same marginal distributions. Hence, this definition makes it possible to separate a joint distribution into the marginal distributions and a n-copula later in this paper.
Definition 2.2. The support of an n-variate cumulative distribution function H is the complement of the union of all open sets of R n with H-volume zero. Intuitively, the support of a mixed strategy is just the closure of the set of pure strategies that might be chosen.
2.2. Strategies. A mixed strategy, or a distribution of force, for player i is an n-variate cumulative distribution function (cdf) P i : R n + → [0, 1] with support in the set of feasible allocations of force B i . This means that if player i chooses strategy (X j ) n j=1 , then the probability that
, one univariate marginal cumulative distribution function for each battle field j.
, where the jth argument is x, and the rest of the arguments are X i , the player's entire allocation of force. We write
In the case where the mixed strategy is the combination of finite pure strategies, the mixed strategy P i where (i 1 j , i 2 j , . . . , i n j ) units of force are distributed the battlefields 1, 2, . . . , n respectively with probability p j is denoted by , is won by the player that provides the higher allocation of force on that battlefield (and declared a draw if both players allocate the same level of force to a battlefield, each gaining a payoff of 1 2n
), and players' payoffs equal the sum of the payoffs over all the battlefields.
2.4. Nash equilibrium. Mixed strategies P A and P B form a Nash equilibrium if and only if neither player can increase payoff by changing to a different strategy.
Since this particular game is two-player and constant-sum, it has the interesting property that the equilibrium payoff is always unique:
Theorem 2.1. The Nash equilibrium payoff for both players of any two-player and constantsum game is unique.
Proof. Suppose P A and P B is a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies. Let w i be the payoff for player i. For any pair of Nash equilibrium strategies P Let us consider the payoff for both players when player A plays strategy P A and player B plays strategy P ′ B . Call the payoff for player A v A and the payoff for player B v B . Since P A is a strategy in a Nash equilibrium,
Since we are considering a constant sum game, w A + w 
Optimal univariate marginal distributions for three battlefields
In this section we use copulas to separate the joint distributions of players into the marginal distributions and suitable copula. We also find and prove the unique univariate marginal distribution for ACB(1, 1, 3).
Let us first introduce the concept of copulas:
Definition 3.1. Let I denote the unit interval [0, 1]. An n-copula is a function C from I n to I such that (1) For all x ∈ I n , C(x) = 0 if at least one coordinate of x is 0; and if all coordinates of
The crucial property of n-copulas that we need is the following theorem of Sklar:
Theorem 3.1 (Sklar, [Skl59] ). Let H be an n-variate distribution function with univariate marginal distribution functions F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F n . Then there exists an n-copula C such that for all
Conversely, if C is an n-copula and F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F n are univariate distribution functions, then the function H defined by equation (1) is an n-variate distribution function with univariate marginal distribution functions F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F n .
The proof of this theorem can be found in [SS83] . This theorem establishes the equivalence between a joint distribution on the one hand, and a combination of a complete set of marginal distributions and a n-copula on the other hand. We will now show that the univariate marginal distribution functions and the n-copula are separate components of the players' best responses. Proposition 3.2. In the game ACB(X A , X B , n), suppose that the opponent's strategy is fixed as the distribution P −i , and that X A = X B . Then, in order for player i to maximize payoff under the constraint that the support of the chosen strategy must be in B i , player i must solve an optimization problem. Given that there are no atoms in Nash equilibrium strategies (Theorem 3.5), we can write the Lagrangian for this optimization problem as
where the set of univariate marginal distribution functions F j i n j=1 satisfy the constraint that there exists an n-copula C such that the support of the n-variate distribution
is contained in B i . Proof. The payoff for player i given the opponent's marginal distribution functions F
is the sum of the payoffs across all the battlefields:
Here, the integral is the Riemann-Stieltjes integral, so the integrand is 0 for x > X i . We also use the Riemann-Stieltjes integral for other integrals later in the paper.
That P i is contained in B i implies that the sum of the levels of force across all battlefields is
Hence, the Lagrangian is
Finally, from Theorem 3.1 the n-variate distribution function P i is equivalent to the set of univariate marginal distribution functions
combined with an appropriate n-copula, C, so the result follows directly.
Theorem 3.3. The unique Nash equilibrium univariate marginal distribution functions of the game ACB(1, 1, 3) are for each player to allocate forces according to the following univariate distribution functions:
The expected payoff for both players is . This means that any equilibrium strategies must have the marginal distributions described above, and that any joint distribution with support in B i with such marginal distributions is an equilibrium strategy.
Intuitively, it is easy to see why this particular set of marginal distributions might guarantee a Nash equilibrium. Since the distribution density is the same among the three battlefields, the payoff of a pure strategy p = (a, b, c) remains constant at
(depicted in Figure 1b ). Clearly its marginal distributions are those described in Theorem 3.3, and its support is in B i . Hence, according to Sklar's theorem (Theorem 3.1), for the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distribution functions F j i 3 j=1 characterized in Theorem 3.3, there exists a 3-copula C such that the support of the 3-variate distribution function C (F
Before we provide the formal proof of Theorem 3.3, we first seek to provide some intuition for the outline of the proof, which takes inspiration from the proofs in [Rob06] and [BKdV96] .
(0, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0)
(1, 0, 0) (b) The strategy that distributes uniformly on the blue lines is an equilibrium strategy.
(0, 0, 1) (c) The strategy that distributes uniformly on the red lines is an equilibrium strategy. From equation (2) in Proposition 3.2, we know that in an Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game ACB(1, 1, 3), each player's Lagrangian can be written as
0,
subject to the constraint that there exists an n-copula, C, such that the support of the
If there exists a suitable 3-copula, then, for different j, F j i is independent. So equation (3) is the maximization of three independent sums, hence the sum of three independent maximizations:
Hence we have reduced the maximization problem over a joint distribution to separate maximization problems over univariate distributions, which can be easily solved.
Note that each separate maximization problem has the same form as that of an all-pay auction. An all-pay auction is an auction where several players simultaneously call out a bid for a prize, and all bidders pay regardless of who wins the prize; the prize is awarded to the highest bidder. In an all-pay auction with two bidders, let F i represent bidder i's distribution of the bid, and v i represent the value of the auction for bidder i. Each bidder i's problem is max
In the separate maximization problems for the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game, the quantity 1 3λ i acts as the value v i for the all-pay auctions. Lemma 3.13 establishes the uniqueness of the Lagrange multipliers, hence the uniqueness of the value v i .
A potential issue that arises is whether the constraint that the strategy P i must be in B i leads to equilibria outside those characterized by Theorem 3.3. From Sklar's Theorem (Theorem 3.1), we know that the joint distribution P i is equivalent to a set of marginal distributions
, together with a suitable 3-copula C. So if a suitable 3-copula exists, the constraint that P i be in B i places no restraint on the set of potential univariate marginal distribution functions,
; instead, this constraint and the set of univariate marginal distributions places a restraint on the set of feasible 3-copulas. Since Theorem 3.4 establishes the existence of suitable 3-copula, this is not an issue.
On the other hand, the restriction on the 3-copula implies that the set of equilibrium 3-variate distributions for the game forms a strict subset of the set of all 3-variate distribution functions with univariate marginal distribution functions characterized by Theorem 3.3.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 under the assumption that suitable 3-copula exists is contained in the results that fill up the rest of this section. The proof takes inspiration from the proofs found in [Rob06] and [BKdV96] .
First, for the form of the Lagrangian in Proposition 3.2 to be accurate, we need show that there are no atoms in any Nash equilibrium strategies. The following theorem proves this in the more general case of equal levels of force for both players and any n number of battlefields where n ≥ 3: Theorem 3.5. If n ≥ 3, then Nash equilibrium strategies for ACB(1, 1, n) cannot contain atoms.
Proof. Suppose that we have an equilibrium strategy P A with an atom in battlefield j on a j .
Let
. . , b n ) be any pure strategy in the support of P A that contains playing a j on battlefield j. The general idea of this proof will be to find a pure strategy p ′ that does strictly better against P A than p, thus reaching a contradiction that P A cannot be an equilibrium strategy as we supposed.
Let f k (a) denote the possibility of choosing a on battlefield k in P A . If b k is any point that is not an atom and b k is greater than b k−1 (or greater than 0 in the case of b 1 ), then consider the pure strategy p ′ that plays ε lower on battlefield k and plays ε ′ = ε n−j+1 higher on battlefield j and all the battlefields after that. We can always find sufficiently small positive ε and ε ′ such that there is no atom between b k and b k − ε in P A . So the payoff of p ′ against P A minus the payoff of p against P A is at least 1 n f k (a j ) − δ for any δ > 0. Hence, p ′ does strictly better than p against P A . Therefore, for P A to be an equilibrium strategy, all such b k that are not atoms must be equal to b k−1 (or 0 if k = 1). So every pure strategy p in the support of P A containing the atom a j on battlefield j must be of the following form: a series of zeros in the first few battlefields (possibly none), an atom, the same level of force in the next few battlefields (also possibly none), another atom, the same level of force (as in the previous atom) in the next few battlefields, and so forth. Now, one of the following statements must be true:
(1) All p in the support of P A containing the atom a j on battlefield j is played with probability 0. (2) There exists some p = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) in the support of P A containing the atom a j on battlefield j that is played with a positive probability, hence every c k is an atom on battlefield k.
Suppose that statement 1 is true. For a j to be played with some positive probability, there must be a continuum of such p. Hence there must also be a continuum of atoms, which is clearly impossible. So statement 2 must be true. Let q = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) be such a pure strategy in the support of P A where every c k is an atom on battlefield k. Some casework is needed here:
(1) All the c k are the same. Then they must all be 1 n . In any pure strategy where player A plays 1 n on the first battlefield, he must also play 1 n on all the other battlefields. So
Consider the pure strategy q ′ that plays 1 n − ε on battlefield 1 and plays
on all the other battlefields. We can find a sufficiently small positive ε such that there are no atoms between 1 n and 1 n − ε on battlefield 1. The payoff of q ′ against P A minus the payoff of q against P A is at least
for any δ > 0. So q ′ does strictly better against P A than q. . Given any pure strategy in the support of P A that plays d 1 on battlefield (m + 1), it must also play d 1 on all the battlefields after that, and play 0 on the battlefields 1 to m.
Consider the pure strategy q ′ that plays d 1 − ε on battlefield (m + 1) and plays c k + ε n−1 on battlefield k for all k = m+1. We can find a sufficiently small positive ε such that there are no atoms between d 1 and d 1 − ε on battlefield (m + 1). The payoff of q ′ against P A minus the payoff of q against P A is at least:
for any δ > 0. So q ′ does strictly better against P A than q. (b) If d 0 > 0, then at least one of the following two must be true:
Similar to the arguments above, if the first one is true, then we can construct a q ′ by playing ε lower on battlefield (m + 1) and ε ′ higher on all the other battlefields; if the second one is true, then we can construct a q ′ by playing ε higher on battlefield (m + 1) and all the battlefields after that, and playing ε ′ lower on battlefields 1 to m. In either case, q ′ does strictly better than q against P A . (3) All the c k fall into at least three different values. So from these values we can choose two different values that are not zero. Then we apply the proof in item 2b and obtain the needed pure strategy q ′ .
In all the cases, a contradiction is reached, showing that P A cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
In the following discussions, let P = {F j } 3 j=1 be any joint distribution characterized in Theorem 3.3, and let P ′ = {f j } 3 j=1 be any equilibrium strategy. Our goal is to prove that P is an equilibrium strategy, and that P and P ′ have the same marginal distributions. ; and the payoff is less than 1 2 otherwise.
Proof. Suppose A plays the mixed strategy P and B plays the pure strategy p = (a, b, c), where 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c and a + b + c = 1. Then, let W (a, b, c) be the payoff for B. So
Our goal is to find the maximum value of W (a, b, c) in B and to show that it is no greater than 0. Clearly, 0 ≤ a ≤ W (a, b, c) = 1 3 (3a + 0 + 1)
Equality holds if and only if F 3 (c) = 3c − 1, which is equivalent to
. In this case 0 ≤ a ≤ . Otherwise, equality does not hold, and the payoff is less than 1 2 . Lemma 3.7. Any joint strategy P as characterized in Theorem 3.3 is a Nash equilibrium strategy.
Proof. We know that the game ACB(1, 1, 3) is symmetrical and has constant sum 1, and since Lemma 3.6 indicates that P gives a payoff of at least 1 2 against any pure strategy, so P must be an equilibrium strategy.
. Clearly,s j is just the upper bound of P on battlefield j, and s j is the lower bound.
Lemma 3.8.
Proof. This is self-evident from the representation of F j in Theorem 3.3: Proof. Since ACB(1, 1, 3) is a two player symmetric constant sum 1 game, every pure strategy in the support of P ′ , an equilibrium strategy, must give the unique equilibrium payoff, 1 2 , when played against another equilibrium strategy, P . From Lemma 3.6 we know that a pure strategy p only gives payoff 1 2 against P when p plays a level of force between s j ands j on battlefield j for all j. So P ′ cannot play any strategy outside that range.
Corollary 3.10. f j (s j ) = 0 and f j (s j ) = 1.
Proof. Theorem 3.5 implies that f j is continuous. This, together with Lemma 3.9, gives the desired result.
Let us recall player i's optimization problem for ACB(1, 1, 3) (equation (2) in Proposition 3.2):
where the set of univariate marginal distribution functions
satisfy the constraint that there exists a 3-copula C such that the support of the 3-variate distribution
is contained in B i . From the lemmas above, we can add some further restrictions to it. From Lemma 3.9, we know that P i must be played within s j , s j for every battlefield j. From Lemma 3.7, we know that P is an equilibrium strategy, so P i must be a best response against P and vice versa. Since Theorem 3.4 establishes the existence of suitable 3-copula, we can disregard that restriction for now and focus on the rest. For different j, F j i is independent. So equation (3) is the maximization of three independent sums, hence the sum of three independent maximizations:
The term λ i X i is just a constant, so we could throw that away. Thus the problem for player i becomes:
for all battlefields j, under the constraint that P A is a best response against P , P is a best response against P A , and P A is played within [s j ,s j ]. Let us set
. Since we assume the existence of a suitable 3-copula, the different f j can be considered independent and the different maximizations for different battlefields can also be considered independent. Hence, f j and F j form an equilibrium for all j.
. This is the payoff for player i by playing x j i when player −i plays F j −i in the maximization problem for battlefield j.
Proof. Since F j is an equilibrium strategy against f j , every strategy in the support of F gives a constant payoff against f j . Since the support of F j is [s j ,s j ], the result directly follows.
Lemma 3.12.
Proof. From Corollary 3.10,
−λ is j . The result directly follows from Lemma 3.11.
Lemma 3.13. λ i = 1 for all i.
Proof. From Lemma 3.12, we have
for all j, so λ i = 1.
Lemma 3.14.
for all j and all x j .
Proof. From Lemmas 3.12 and 3.13, we have f j (x j ) = x j −s j s j −s j for s j ≤ x j ≤s j and all j. From Lemma 3.8, the value of f j coincides with the value of F j here. Corollary 3.10 ensures that f j and F j are the same elsewhere.
With these lemmas, we can prove the uniqueness of the marginal distributions in the Nash equilibria of the game ACB (1, 1, 3) . We restate the theorem here for convenience.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. From Lemma 3.7 we know that every joint distribution with marginal distribution functions as characterized above is a Nash equilibrium strategy, hence the second part of the theorem is proved. Lemma 3.14 establishes the uniqueness of marginal distributions of Nash equilibrium strategies, and proves that these marginal distributions are exactly those characterized above. Hence, we have proven the first part of the theorem.
4. Unique equilibrium payoffs of the game ACB(X A , X B , 2)
In this section we find the unique equilibrium payoffs of all cases of the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game involving only two battlefields.
Suppose without loss of generality that X A = 1 and X B = t ≤ 1. Let W n (t) denote the payoff for A in a Nash equilibrium in such a game with n battlefields. From Theorem 2.1, we know that W n (t) is well-defined.
Theorem 4.1.
where k = 0, 1, 2, . . . The proof for W 2 (t) and constructions of Nash equilibriums can be found later in this section. Before we go on to prove this, let us first prove a lemma regarding the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game with two battlefields: Lemma 4.2. Suppose that X A > X B . If player A deploys the pure strategy (a, X A − a) and B deploys the pure strategy (b, X B − b), then
where W A is the payoff for player A.
Proof.
Hence,
With the help of Lemma 4.2, we can prove Theorem 4.1:
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
(1) Suppose that t < , 1 and P B to be any strategy. P A and P B form a Nash equilibrium and W 2 (t) = 1.
Given any pure strategy (x, t−x) of B, we must have
≥ x, and 2 3 > t ≥ t − x. Thus in this case, the payoff to B is 0. This means that B cannot increase payoff regardless of the strategy (or mixed strategy) chosen. On the other hand, the payoff of A is 1, which is the maximum possible value, so clearly neither can A increase payoff by changing strategy. Hence, P A = , 1 and any P B form a Nash equilibrium and W 2 (t) = 1. (2) Suppose k is such that 2k 2k+1
, where k ∈ Z + . Take
where ε is such that
The notation here just means that player A plays pure strategy
with probability 1 k+1
for all j such that 0 ≤ j ≤ k; and player B plays pure strategy (j(1 − t), t − j(1 − t)) with probability 1 k+1
for all j such that 0 ≤ j ≤ k. Then we claim that P A and P B form a Nash equilibrium and W 2 (t) = k+2 2k+2
. First we will show that these mixed strategies are legitimate. If t < 2k+2 2k+3
, then 2k+3 2 t < k + 1, so
, which in turn implies that 2k + 1 2
Hence, a positive ε satisfying equation (4) exists. Further, we need to check that the level of force distributed on the first battlefield, x 1 , is less than or equal to the force distributed on the second battlefield, x 2 ; or, equivalently, for player i, we need to check that x 1 ≤ X i 2
. First, let's check player A's strategy. Since j ≤ k, we must have
Then we plug in the upper bound of ε in equation (4) and get
. Now let's check player B's strategy. We already know that t ≥ 2k 2k+1
, rearrange and we would get
Since j(1 − t) ≤ k(1 − t), we must have
So both P A and P B are legitimate mixed strategies. Suppose A chooses some pure strategy p
where 0 ≤ a ≤ k + 1. Now let us expand P B into pure strategies in the calculation of
There is a ≤ sign on the second line since if a = k + 1, there is one additional non-negative term on the right, W A ((x, 1 − x), ((k + 1)(1 − t), t − (k + 1)(1 − t))), compared with the original formula.
First let us consider the sum
Here,
Hence, according to Lemma 4.2,
Then let us consider the sum
If x = a(1 − t), then according to Lemma 4.2,
If x > a(1 − t), then according to Lemma 4.2,
. So A cannot increase payoff above 
If y = b(1 − t) + ε, then according to Lemma 4.2,
If y < b(1 − t) + ε, then according to Lemma 4.2,
Therefore, in either case,
Similarly,
And since (1 − t)(k − 1) + ε < y < (1 − t)k + ε,
, which means that B cannot increase payoff above k 2k+2 by changing strategy. Hence, P A and P B form a Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium payoff for A is W 2 (t) = k+2 2k+2 . (3) Finally, suppose that t = 1. Take any mixed strategy P A and any mixed strategy P B .
Then they form a Nash equilibrium with W 2 (t) = 1 2
. To see this, suppose A plays the pure strategy P ′ A = (a, 1 − a) and B plays the pure strategy P
Hence, the payoff is 1 2 regardless of the pure strategies that both players play. As a result, the payoff is also 1 2 regardless of what mixed strategies that the two players play.
5. Unique equilibrium payoffs of the game ACB(X A , X B , 3)
In this section we find the unique equilibrium payoffs of some cases of the Asymmetric Colonel Blotto game involving three battlefields. The results that follow are ordered by ascending values of t.
Suppose without loss of generality that X A = 1 and X B = t ≤ 1. The case where t = 1 is already solved in Section 3, and we have W 3 (1) = 1 2 . In the following discussions, let the function s(x) be defined as follows:
Theorem 5.1. In the case where t < 6 11 , w 3 (t) = 1.
Proof. In this case, player A can simply overwhelm player B in all the battlefields.
Take P A = { ( ), 1 } and P B to be any strategy. P A and P B form a Nash equilibrium and W 3 (t) = 1.
To conclude, player A cannot increase payoff above 8 9
by changing strategy, and player B can also not increase payoff above 1 9 by changing strategy. So P A , P B form a Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium payoff W 3 (t) = and we get • If c = • If c > by changing strategy, and player B can also not increase payoff above 1 6 by changing strategy. So P A , P B form a Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium payoff, W 3 (t), is .
